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Introduction
With the fall of dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia was 
consumed by a civil war which extends to present day. Tens of thousands 
have died or were exiled and many others are homeless in cities such as 
Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo. The country hasn't had a functional gov-
ernment for practically three weeks, and large portions of its territory are 
under the control of paramilitary or terrorist groups, such as al-Shabaab3, 
and warlords. For six years (2008-2013), Somalia has led the Fragile States 
Index elaborated by US journal Foreign Policy and by the group Fund for 
Peace. Two UN missions have been dispatched to the region in the 1990s 
(UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II) and two transitional governments have been 
formed. Moreover, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) has been 
active since 2007 supporting government transitions, training the country's 
armed forces and helping with the logistics of humanitarian aid. However, 
despite all the efforts directed at solving the conflict and constructing a func-
tional state, political stability seems like a distant dream, and the survival 
of Somalia's central government is highly dependent on the African Union 
and AMISOM (Forti 2011, 5).
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Nevertheless, there is a remarkable case of stability and peace in a 
territorial area internationally-recognised as Somali. In Northern Somalia, 
a region called Somaliland has claimed independence in 1991, after the fall 
of dictator Mohamed Siad Barre. Since then, the self-declared nation has 
undergone six national elections, has created functional institutions, such as 
a central bank and a judiciary system, has improved educational indexes and 
has maintained a minimum level of stability. Yet, even as it is a de facto state4 
under the logics of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States5, no other country recognizes it as a sovereign nation.
This case study's objective is to structure a chronological explanation 
about how, even in a completely adverse situation, without international 
recognition and surrounded by conflicts, Somaliland was able to build a 
minimally functional and stable state. Using the existing literature about 
the issue, as well as analyses of international organization's reports and of 
some of the country's most important legal documents, such as its newest 
Constitution, we will try to reconstruct the events that led Somaliland to its 
current state of relative stability. Elements such as civil society's participation 
and traditional Somali governance mechanisms were used in a successful way 
in this process, mitigating the inevitable flaws of an emerging democracy. 
Consequently, as Kaplan (2008) writes, the case of Somaliland can bring 
important lessons not only to its neighbors, but also to other post-colonial 
nations in Africa and the Middle East.
Somali Traditional Society
In order to better understand events in Somalia and Somaliland, it is 
important to present Somali people's forms of organization. They profoundly 
influenced post-independence episodes in the Horn of Africa, especially the 
construction of the Somaliland state.
The Somali descend from a lineage of peoples who, for thousands 
of years, have lived in the coastal area of the Horn of Africa. Their culture is 
a mixture of traditions developed from the contact with nearby civilizations, 
such as those from the Arabian Peninsula, Northeastern Africa, as well as from 
more distant communities, such as peoples from the Indian subcontinent 
and Southeast Asia (Abdullahi 2001, 155). Their society is defined by aggre-
4 The term designates a territory with the characteristics of a state.
5 The Convention determines the necessary criteria to incorporate a state under interna-
tional law.
111Pio Penna Filho, Henrique Oliveira da Motta
Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 6, n. 11, Jan./Jun. 2021 | p. 109-127
gate kinship relationships and ruled by customary Somali law (Xeer), Islamic 
practices and commune-driven conflict mediation (Forti 2011, 8). Although 
Islam is predominant and fervently adored, Samatar (1989) describes the 
existence of a mix of pragmatism and flexibility in its devotion, largely due 
to the demands and inconsistencies of the Somali pastoral lifestyle.
Clan system
Ethnically, Somalia is one of the most uniform countries in Africa. It 
is currently estimated that 85% of its inhabitants, including Somalilanders, 
are ethnically Somali (WPR, n.d.). However, this doesn't mean that there 
are no internal cleavages. Somalis organize in a complex clan system which 
defines the communities' political and social identities (Kaplan 2008, 144). In 
order to be defined to which clan someone belongs, this individual's paternal 
family tree must be analysed until a connection to the main Somali families 
or clans is found (Darod, Dir, Hawie, Issaq and Rahanweyn), the Darods and 
the Issaqs being the largest clans in the region. Clans are the primary identity 
of a large part of Somalis (Walls 2009, 377). Therefore, elders, responsible for 
leading their clans, are important characters in the country's political scene. 
Somalis frequently use their relationships, in any of these layers, to stimulate 
cooperation, support and motivation in their communities.
Because they are connected through distant common ancestors, 
going as far as 15 generations in the past (Lewis 1959, 276), clans are exten-
sive units. Naturally, they have dozens of subdivisions. More defined lineages 
inside a clan culminate in forming sub-clans, which often possess a sense of 
identity. When an individual is part of a sub-clan, this group will be the one 
that he or she mentions as being a part of (Lewis 1959, 276). The most basic 
unit of this system, other than nuclear families, are the dia-settlement groups. 
These are groups with a common ancestor from four to eight generations 
past, constituted by a few hundred to a few thousand men (Lewis 1959, 276) 
and formed via verbal or written contract. In case of homicide, for example, 
these are the groups which will either pay or receive compensation, which 
is also called dia. Based on Lewis (1959) and Forti (2011), we can delineate 
the following order of importance for affiliations related to the Somali clan 
system: 1) the family nucleus is the basic unit, led by an elder; 2) next are 
dia-payer groups, which constitute a combination of families with a closest 
common ancestor;  3) sub-clans, when existing inside a larger clan; 4) clans 
are the most comprehensive identity in this system, comprising thousands, 
sometimes millions of people, and having multiple internal divisions.
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Traditional Political-Normative Instruments
This traditional Somali organization system is ruled by consensual 
decision-making mechanisms which develop under a net of agreements and 
unwritten rules. In order to understand the regional context and the forma-
tion process of contemporary Somaliland, it is fundamental to understand 
such instruments.
The Xeer is one of the main institutions of Somali society, a type of 
customary Somali law (Kaplan 2011, 145). It represents unwritten agree-
ments between any unit of the clan system, from family nuclei to the main 
groups. It rules various aspects of life, determining, for example, the due 
compensation in case of injury, territorial division or even the use of natural 
resources. When an incident occurs, a delegation of elders, known as ergo, 
is sent to the place where the trial will happen (Wojkowska 2006, 54). Its 
members will be the judges of the case, and must be from a neutral clan or 
from extended families of the parties in dispute, which usually are equally 
represented. Normally, 10 elders take place, five from the victim's ethnic 
group and five from the aggressor's ethnic group (Lombard 2005). Such 
individuals are generally chosen because of their knowledge, but there are no 
specific trainings in law and they can elaborate their own doctrines. Trials are 
commonly open to the public and take place under a tree. Oral presentations 
of the case, witnesses and evidences are used in the same way as any other 
legal system (Wojkowska 2006, 54).
This customary law system has many problems. A militarily stronger 
clan, for instance, can refuse to follow the determinations of the ergo (Wojkow-
ska 2006, 20), which means that many minority groups are discriminated 
upon. Moreover, in such a system there are problematic issues involving the 
rights of women. A woman victim of rape, for example, is frequently forced to 
marry her aggressor. This is done to supposedly protect the woman's honor 
and to assure that her family gets paid an endowment by the aggressor's 
family (Wojkowska 2006, 21). Despite these negative aspects, the Xeer is of 
fundamental importance to maintain peace in the region, for it minimizes 
conflict and creates a culture of negotiation among Somalis. Its flexibility and 
adaptability also adapt to the nomadic lifestyle (Forti 2011, 9).
The Shir, another important traditional Somali mechanism, has on 
its essence the combination of the structure of clans and the Xeer. Such mech-
anism constitutes of meetings in which decisions are made in a consensual 
and democratic way (Lewis 1999, 198). Meetings are summoned on an ad 
hoc basis and can last for hours, days, or even months. They are used to 
deliberate on any issue that could affect the community, such as lawmaking, 
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distribution of resources or conflict resolution. As described by I.M. Lewis 
(1999), it is the fundamental governance institution in the Somali culture. 
In it, each married man can speak for any of his four divisions in the clan 
system. This institution is the primary representation of some kind of Somali 
'pastoral democracy'. However, this system, as well as all the Somali clan 
structure, has a highly patriarchal organization, giving women a secondary 
role. Women's political functions are reduced to serving as a bridge between 
groups through marriage.
Colonization
The geopolitical situation of the African continent is largely a direct 
and indirect result of its colonization. It formed new boundaries and altered 
the power dynamics among ethnic groups on the whole continent. It is 
fundamental to understand the colonization of the Horn of Africa in order to 
understand the region's current situation. The events that have led Somalil-
and to declare its independence are linked to this process.
French, British and Italians established settlements in the region 
from the end of the 19th century. Previously, Somalis were organized in several 
city-states relatively independent from one another, with the Adal Sultan-
ate and the state of Ajuuraan among the most famous (Forti 2011, 10). As 
described by Samatar (1989), these centralized governmental structures were 
important for the Somali pastoral society to expand its network of trade and 
to create an effective tax-collecting system. From the beginning of the direct 
European occupation, the territories that would later become Somalia were 
divided in two. They were called British Somaliland (current Somaliland) to 
the North, and Italian Somaliland (current Somalia) to the South.
Between 1884 and 1960, Somaliland was an important, although 
small,  British possession. From it, the British obtained the necessary cattle 
to supply their other colonies with, such as Yemen (Forti 2011, 11). Their 
approach in the protectorate of the Horn of Africa was different from the one 
used by the French and Italian in the region. The British were not interested 
in creating a country-colony in Somaliland (Ahmed and Green 1999, 115). 
Due to the difficulty in centralizing power, characteristic of the nomadic 
lifestyle of the Somalis, they adopted a policy of alliance with chiefs of local 
clans (Akils), who would serve as a link between imperial administration 
and locals. In Somaliland, therefore, the clans maintained their lifestyle and 
continued to use their laws and decision-making mechanisms.
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In Italian Somaliland, changes imposed by colonizers were more 
drastic. According to Samatar (1989), their policies, driven by a sense of 
civilizing mission, Roman nostalgia and the pursuit of prestige, undermined 
traditional Somali structures, diminishing the elder's power and, often, expro-
priating their lands. With the beginning of Mussolini's leadership, in 1923, 
Italians imposed an even stricter colonial system, aiming to export agricul-
tural goods. The most fertile lands were confiscated without compensation, 
rural workers were subjected to forced labor in the fields. The quick transition 
from a subsistence to an export system resulted in the shortage of food and 
generalized hunger (Walls 2011, 98).
The organization imposed by Italians in the area controlled by them 
followed Western examples, disregarding local customs and forms of gover-
nance. Consequently, great unbalance was created. A small educated Somali 
elite in the West was formed and took control of the public administration 
(Forti 2011, 12). Moreover, due to the changes in agriculture, many people 
moved to the cities, where large peripheral neighborhoods, previously non-
existent, were formed (Kaplan 2008, 146).
Colonization created a series of socioeconomic distortions in Somali 
society and aggravated possible political differences between the Southern 
clans (mainly Darods and Hawies) and Northern clans (mainly Issaqs). This 
would be a crucial legacy for political events in the post-independence years.
Independence and the Siad Barre Era
In 1960, British Somaliland declared its independence on June 26th. 
Soon after, on July 1st, Italian Somaliland followed suit. On the same day, both 
nations, now independent, held a joint session which resulted in the union 
of both countries in a single large republic. Thus emerged the Republic of 
Somalia. Political issues were soon centralized in Mogadishu, which became 
the capital of the new country. A new constitution was created, in which 
freedom of expression, democracy and a multi-party system were granted 
(Ahmed and Green 1999, 116).
Although the union was widely supported and quickly accepted by 
the Northern states, which had belonged to the British Somaliland, it wasn't 
long until dissatisfaction with the new structure emerged in the region. 
Southerners occupied most jobs in the government and held the majority 
of seats in Parliament (Ahmed and Green 1999, 116). Public administration 
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was concentrated among Southern groups, which marginalized sectors of 
the former British Somaliland.
The new government's policies were also fount of dissatisfaction. Not 
much effort was made to alleviate underdevelopment and the exaggerated 
stratification of the colonial period. Another negative factor was the latent 
corruption in the public sector. Indicated by many as an inheritance of the 
Italian colonial administration (Italian factor), it rapidly mined the regime's 
legitimacy (Ahmed and Green 1999, 116). The newly created Somali democ-
racy, previously presented as a mechanism to create union and prosperity, 
became a catalyst of tension and inequality.
In 1969, the country was completely divided. In that year's elections, 
fragmentation was at such a level that around 60 political parties ran for 
a seat in Parliament (Walls 2011, 116). In October that year, president Abd 
ar-Rashid Ali Shirmake was assassinated by his bodyguard, which led the 
country to chaos. The incident evoked discussions regarding succession, and 
the whole electoral process was seen with distrust due to suspected corruption 
(Forti 2011, 15). In this context, Mohamed Siad Barre, a general in the Somali 
Army, gathered his troops and took Mogadishu in a bloodless military coup.
Barre was a member of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), a 
Marxist-Leninist wing of the Somali Army. Now in power, he took the initial 
measures to revoke the constitution, to dissolve Parliament and to prohibit 
any form of political association. Barre defended the application of "scientific 
socialism", seeking to substitute, through the state, the clan's functions of 
promoting security, leadership and welfare (Barre 1970). In short, the former 
general claimed that he would try to transform Somalia into a modern nation 
state. His initial promises also mentioned the eradication of tribalism and 
the future decentralization of power.
Barre was supported by a large part of the population, which saw in 
his figure an escape from the divisions hindering the young nation's devel-
opment. However, his promises of union soon deteriorated. The SRC regime 
counted with the massive support of the Darod clan and manipulated clan 
rivalry in order to neutralize any form of political opposition (Haldén 2008, 
24). Besides, due to Barre's alignment with the Soviet Union, the country 
received large aid packages, which were used by the government to strengthen 
the Army and maintain itself in power (Walls 2011, 119).
The socialist experiment made successful reforms in the health 
and education sectors. However, it nationalized important enterprises and 
administered them in an inefficient way. Bad management and the favoring 
of specific groups had terrible results. Between 1974 and 1975, the lack of 
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supply, combined with a drought, resulted in 20,000 people dead in the North 
(Ahmed and Green 1999, 117). Paradoxically, the Somali Army was then one 
of the largest and better equipped in Africa, due to Soviet support (Drysdale 
2000, 17). Relying on this and seeking to reinforce Somali nationalism, 
Siad Barre decided, instead of solving the problem of hunger, to invade the 
Ethiopian region of the Ogaden, with a great Somali population.
The invasion of Ogaden in 1977 rapidly evolved to a large-scale con-
flict. The Ethiopian government, previously a monarchy led by Haile Selassie, 
the "Rastafari", was now controlled by a Marxist-Leninist military junta. In 
this framework, Cuba and the Soviet Union saw the opportunity to change 
the region's dynamics (Walls 2011, 121). Both countries cut their support to 
Somalia and began supporting the Ethiopian forces. Ethiopia was traditionally 
a regional hegemon and, in the socialist powers' point of view, it would be a 
more important ally than Somalia.
The Somali defeat, in 1978, was humiliating. Hunger, devastation and 
economic crisis fell upon the country, especially in the North, where many 
refugees settled (Ahmed and Green 1999, 118). Northerners' dissatisfaction 
with the regime was growing and many Issaqs, a major clan in the North, 
were marginalized in their own territory.
Naturally, opposition movements began organizing. In former Brit-
ish Somaliland, the Somali National Movement (SNM) emerged in 1981, an 
organization formed by businessmen, clerics, academics and former military 
belonging to the Issaq clan. The group was trying to overthrow Barre, forming 
bases in Northern cities such as Hargeisa and Burao.
Like the SNM, other opposition groups emerged throughout the 
country. The former general's government, which had previously relied on 
domestic support, now depended on repression and foreign aid to hold on 
to power (Kaplan 2008, 146). Formerly an ally of the Soviet Union, Barre's 
regime now was aligned to the United States, which began to send financial 
support to the country in the first half of the 1980s decade. However, towards 
the final phases of the Cold War, the amount of aid sent by Americans was 
drastically reduced. With many organized opposition groups and with no 
external financial support, Barre's fall became inevitable.
In 1991, after a series of battles and protests around the country, 
Mohamed Siad Barre fled Mogadishu. Immediately, the country and its polit-
ical structures collapsed. This marked the beginning of the Somali Civil War. 
There is no exact date to the outset of the conflict, but generalized confron-
tation between rebel groups and the Somali government's Armed Forces 
started in 1988 (Menkhaus 2007, 73).
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From the construction of the Somaliland  
state to current days
Dissatisfaction in the North due to the union of the two Somalias 
dated back to the 1960s, when Southern clans took key positions in the 
administration, marginalizing local clans, especially the Issaqs and their sub-
clans. In Barre's regime, differences were aggravated. After his fall, in 1991, 
the SNM gathered elders from Northern clans and sub-clans in a national 
conference in the city of Burao, known as shir beeleddka, or clan meeting (Ali 
2013, 394). An important part of this process was the conciliatory behavior 
of the Issaqs. As a Northern majority clan, they could try to retaliate the 
violence that they suffered, but, under the leadership of their elders, they 
decided to end conflict in their lands and sought to use traditional Somali 
governance mechanisms in order to build bridges between clans. From the 
beginning, this search for consensus based on the clan system and its infor-
mal mechanisms, as well as the balance in each clan's representation were 
marks of the construction of the region's hybrid political order. In the end, 
the greatest result of the Burao Conference was Somaliland's proclamation 
of independence, which happened on May 18th, 1991.
The trauma of recent events helped create a kind of national identity 
among Northerners. Moreover, despite the future challenges that the new-
ly-created nation would face, this spirit of reconciliation built in Burao helped 
generate a sense of differentiation among the inhabitants of Somaliland 
towards Somalia (Renders and Terlinden 2010, 730).
Upon separation, Somaliland hoped to obtain vast international rec-
ognition. The region had been independent for five days in 1960, before 
its union with Italian Somalia was put into effect. In this brief period, 34 
countries, including the five permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council, recognized its independence (Ali 2013, 338). In 1991, the 
SNM argued that the country was just returning to its original boundaries 
and, therefore, hoped not to find major difficulties in establishing diplomatic 
relations with other nations. However, nations from Africa and other parts of 
the world preferred not to grant such recognition, fearing that the dissolution 
of the Somalian union would bring more instability.
Without recognition and facing serious problems in its territory due 
to conflict with the central government, Somaliland had a big challenge ahead 
of it. The whole process of independence was constructed from a series of 
negotiations between the clans that previously formed the British protector-
ate, which made the country's environment less divisive. The Gadabursi, the 
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Dhulbahante, sub-clans Dir and Harti respectively, were politically distinct 
from the Issaqs, who controlled the SNM. From the actions of elders from 
these clans and their sub-clans, a series of shirs were held in Somaliland 
region. These negotiations formed the basis for the construction of the state.
During the Burao Conference, when independence was declared, 
there were enormous variations in public opinion (Walls 2009, 380). Because 
of this, worried with misinterpretations of the reunion's results, the meeting's 
Central Committee rewrote the elder's final declaration, making it more clear 
and incisive. It was decided that the SNM leader, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali 
'Tuur' would be in Somaliland's presidency for two years. This pattern of shirs 
to solve specific issues, later evolving to national conferences, is something 
that would be repeated many times during the peacebuilding process in the 
region.
Now under SNM leadership, more specifically under Ali Tuur's 
leadership, the newly emancipated, but not yet recognized nation enjoyed a 
brief period of stability, optimism and economic growth. Reunions and large 
meetings continued to happen, now aiming at constructing an agreement 
about what form of government and political representation Somaliland 
should follow (Kaplan 2008, 148). However, in 1992 the SNM government 
started to face some problems. There were disputes among militias of Issaq 
sub-clans in Burao, which evolved to more violent fights inside the city. 
Moreover, the President, while trying to ensure control of taxes in the port 
of Berbera6, ended up initiating a dispute between two Issaq sub-clans. The 
Habar Yoonis, to which he belonged, and the Lise Musa, who had lived in the 
port region for years, were both Issaq sub-clans. After weeks of negotiation, 
an elder delegation of the Gadabursi clan mediated an agreement between 
the government and both groups.
This conflict, although brief, is a very important event to understand 
the formation of Somaliland. The elders consolidated themselves as rele-
vant and formal agents of the country's political structure. Besides, the fact 
that the mediation of a conflict between Issaq sub-clans was conducted by 
a neutral clan showed that the Issaqs wouldn't dominate the state's political 
structure, as was feared by members of minority clans in the region (Walls 
2011, 137). The commitment with the end of retaliation was also notewor-
thy. The term xalaydhalay, which means something like erasing resentment 
from the past, was very noticeable in the process of forming the country. In 
normative terms, a fundamental definition that emerged from this conflict 
was the establishment that the main components of infrastructure, such as 
6 Important Somaliland port city.
119Pio Penna Filho, Henrique Oliveira da Motta
Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 6, n. 11, Jan./Jun. 2021 | p. 109-127
the Berbera and the Zelia ports, as well as the main cities' airports, would be 
under the responsibility of the central government in Hargeisa.
The next step would be to continue building the country's institu-
tions. It had been defined that president Tuur would govern for two years, but 
the following stages were still undefined. It was also important to determine 
how possible future conflicts among clans would be resolved. With such 
objectives, the Borama Conference was held in 1993. With the government 
and the SNM awakened by the Berbera conflict, the president decided to 
assign to the Guurti, a formal council of elders, the responsibility to organize 
the next steps. At that point, the executive transferred the responsibility of 
mediating the construction of institutions and resolving the transition, from 
a civilian government to a Somali traditional institution. Although this didn't 
strengthen the government's power, this was an important measure to unite 
the country around a national project (Walls 2009, 383).
As a result of the Borama Conference, the "Somaliland Communities 
Security and Peace Charter" (Axdiga Nabadgaladyada ee Beelaha Somaliland) 
was created. Based on the principles of shir, it molded the solution of possible 
future conflicts. A National Charter (Axdi Qarameed), which served as an 
interim constitution, was also instituted.
The conference lasted for almost four months and its discussions 
were directed by elders and based on consensus (Forti 2011, 19). Themes 
such as the government system were widely discussed. Certain clans were 
favorable to a strong executive, pending presidentialism. Others defended 
parlamentarism. This issue would also be defined in a consensual manner. 
The Conference was of extreme importance, and many argue that it was 
there that an embryo of national identity was formed (Renders and Terlinden 
2010, 731).
In the end, the institutions formed in the Borama Conference were a 
mix of traditional Somali elements with democratic governance mechanisms. 
This government system was known as Beel. In it, there would be a bicameral 
legislature in which the Guurti would be institutionalized, as a type of Senate, 
sharing responsibilities with the House of Representatives. The Guurti would 
designate the President and determine measures to maintain the region's 
fragile peace. Haji Ibrahim Egal, a member of the Issaq clan and experienced 
politician who had been the Prime-Minister of unified Somalia in the 1960s, 
was chosen for a three-year mandate with the possibility of renewal.
Between 1994 and 1997, new conflicts occurred in the country. Issaq 
sub-clans, disputing natural resources in the Hargeisa and Burao regions, ini-
tiated armed confrontations. Despite interventions of the Guurti, a consensus 
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was not reached. However, civil society organizations, including expatriate 
groups, urged the government to take more incisive actions (Forti 2011, 20). 
Thus, the Hargeisa Conference was established in 1997. After a ceasefire 
was defined, the participants of the meeting, under Egal government's tute-
lage, successfully redefined Somaliland's constitution (Forti 2011, 21). This 
meeting, unlike the previous ones, was financed by the Hargeisa central 
government and didn't count on foreign financial aid. Besides, the number 
of delegates was twice the number of participants of the Borama Conference 
and a reasonable number of women could observe the discussions, although 
they were not allowed to vote (Abokor, Bradbury and Yusuf 2015, 461).
The country's political system was of organized electoral bases cen-
tered in clans for a multi-party democracy (Constitution of Somaliland 2001, 
18-41). Under the leadership of Egal and the Guurti, each clan was consulted, 
which gave strong support and legitimacy to the new Constitution (Abokor, 
Bradbury and Yusuf 2015, 463). In May 2001, a new referendum took place, 
in which 97% of voters approved that the document produced by the Har-
geisa Conference, which formerly only had an interim status, would serve 
as Somaliland's definitive Constitution.
Traditional governance systems had been very effective when the 
state had failed. However, Egal and a great part of the Western-educated 
elite saw a stable future which depended on the adequate establishment of 
a balance between traditional sociocultural inheritances and the country's 
political aspirations. Therefore, presenting the country as a modern nation 
state with a democratic system was important for its political success and 
for obtaining international recognition (Renders and Terlinden 2010, 735). 
This mindset was spread throughout the country and was fundamental for 
the approval of the new Constitution.
In 2002, when he was 74 years old, Egal died. His death generated a 
stronger nationalist connection among the inhabitants of Somaliland. During 
his mandate, Egal had often been criticized for adopting clientelist policies 
and for trying to influence the outcome of important conferences (Renders 
and Terlinden 2010, 731). However, his figure was very respected because 
of the fact that he was an elder statesman, active since the 1960s, and for 
leading the country in the difficult decade of the 1990s (Abokor, Bradbury 
and Yusuf 2015, 463-464). Both influential supporters and passionate oppo-
nents attended his funeral. Thereafter, Vice-President Dahir Riyale Kahin, 
from the Gadabursi clan, fulfilling his constitutional function, took power. 
This transition was memorable, because it was the first time that the presi-
dent wasn't Issaq. Riyale would be elected in 2003 for another mandate and 
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would govern until 2010. The 2003 elections had been controversial, but after 
deliberation by the Guurti and the Supreme Court, they were considered fair 
(Forti 2011, 22). Neutral observers concluded that all parties had benefited 
from loopholes in the legislation, but, even so, considered that the elections 
were fair and definitive. In 2005, parliamentary elections were also considered 
trustworthy, marking the first time that Somalilanders could choose members 
of the House of Representatives, which shares the legislative body with the 
Guurti (Kaplan 2009, 150).
In 2010, presidential elections were also considered free and fair by 
international observers, and happened without greater problems (Ali 2015, 
58). Mohamed Silanyo, an Issaq, was the winner. Voting should have taken 
place in 2008, due to the five-year presidential mandate, but the lack of expe-
rience in organizing elections led to its two-year delay (ICG 2010). Silanyo 
government would be very criticized. During his mandate, inflation soared 
and the country's economy became more fragile. Charges for corruption, data 
fraud and press freedom violations also emerged (Ali 2015, 62).
New general elections were planned for 2015. However, due to a 
severe drought and lack of preparedness by the organizing committee, they 
were postponed to 2017. Similar episodes of election postponement represent 
a recurring problem in Somaliland's young democracy. Pegg and Walls (2018) 
argue that this is the result of two factors: the lack of resources to hold them 
and the absence of political will from incumbents. The Guurti, which acts 
as a Senate, should have its members elected every six years. However, since 
this rule was instituted, in 1997, there was never a poll to choose them. The 
House of Representatives, which functions as a Parliament, hasn't under-
gone elections since 2005. This contributes to the fragility of the country's 
democracy and to an overly presidential dominance. Moreover, during the 
most recent elections, a frequent complaint among voters was that it was dif-
ficult to identify the differences among the country's main parties. Disputes 
for positions inside the parties, as well as alliances of convenience showed 
a growing opportunistic feature in the nation's politics and created a certain 
cynicism among voters (Abokor, Bradbury and Yusuf 2015, 463-464).
In 2017, elections successfully happened. Musa Bihi Abdi, a former 
Air Force Issaq pilot, indicated by Silanyo, who did not run for reelection, 
was the winner. Parliamentary elections, on its turn, are still pending, and 
have been postponed since 2005. Abdi's government inherited important 
challenges from Silanyo. The former leader had created policies favorable to 
his clan, the Issaqs, and imbalance in the distribution of public positions for 
each group (Ali 2015, 65). A possible resurgence of clan rivalry is one of the 
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greatest threats to Somaliland's democracy, with the potential to seriously 
affect its ambition for international recognition. Therefore, it is crucial for 
the government to take conciliatory actions in this matter.
Adbi, however, has been seeking to improve his country's position in 
the international arena in other ways. His government has developed closer 
ties to the United Arab Emirates, a nation that could, possibly, be the first to 
recognize the country as a sovereign state. In 2018, both governments closed 
a deal for the construction of a military base in the region, but due to tensions 
in Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni War, the final project has been transformed 
into a civilian airport (Reuters 2019). Abdi has also met with representa-
tives of Mogadishu's federal Somali government on two occasions. The first 
meeting happened in February 2020, and the second one in June, when the 
Horn of Africa had already been hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. In those 
meetings, Abdi showed reasons for Somaliland secession, citing the 1933 
Montevideo Convention and the country's brief independence period in 1960 
(Muse Bihi Abdi Speech [...], 2020). However, little progress was made. Both 
governments sought advances in other areas, such as the division of foreign 
aid. This is a crucial issue for Somaliland, because currently any attempt to 
support the country must pass through Somalia first. In the end, little was 
decided, but Abdi obtained a small political victory by receiving head of state 
treatment during the meetings, which were held in Ethiopia and Djibouti.
Although the country has plenty of specific issues, its last challenge 
was shared with the whole world: the COVID-19 pandemic. Its response 
received compliments from international organizations such as the WHO, 
while neighboring nations, such as Somalia itself, couldn't manage to mini-
mally control the spread of the virus (Mukami 2020). Without foreign aid, the 
country raised US$15 million internally to face the disease, created informa-
tive campaigns and efficient restrictions to the movement of people in cities 
(Rubin 2020). Somaliland's appropriate response can bring good political 
outcomes for the country. The European Union and the USA, looking for 
stability in the region, have sent large sums to the government of Somalia, 
which administers the resources inefficiently (Rubin 2020). At the same time, 
Somaliland has done a good job with a small amount of money, which can 
make foreign donors give the country more attention and treat it separately 
from Somalia when donating.
During the pandemic, Somaliland also evoked comparisons with 
Taiwan, an Asian nation which also seeks for international recognition as 
an independent territory. The similarities in both countries' situations made 
them establish diplomatic relations at the beginning of July, foreseeing pos-
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sible agreements in the fields of fishing, agriculture, mining and education 
(Aspinwall 2020). This could mean a turning point in the country's history, 
as it can now count on a valuable partner.
Conclusion
Challenges ahead of the Somaliland state are huge. The country has 
to deal with frequent deadly droughts and with the persistence of deep socio-
economic problems. The nation still has a huge task in obtaining interna-
tional recognition. However, since its independence, Somaliland was able to 
maintain stability in its territory and to organize transitions of power between 
different groups, such as the one after president Egal's death. The country's 
balance contrasts with the generalized chaos in Somalia, to the South.
The reasons for Somaliland's success in comparison with Somalia 
date back to the country's colonization. In British Somaliland, the region's 
peoples, although subject to cruel domination, could maintain their customs 
and forms of governance. While to the South, Italians imposed their form 
of administration and created considerable imbalance in social structure. 
Thus, when confronted with Mohamed Siad Barre's tyranny, Northern clans 
managed to organize more easily.
The elder's pragmatism after the declaration of independence, in 
1991, is another important factor for the region's success. The many con-
ferences held to solve controversies and build institutions happened in a 
methodical way, approaching a new issue only when the previous one had 
been resolved (Kaplan 2008, 148). The use of traditional Somali customs 
was also key to achievement. Meetings shaped from the Shir and agreements 
based on the Xeer facilitated understanding among different clans and their 
union around the ideal of a nation.
In the political sphere, the idea that in order to obtain international 
recognition it would be necessary to establish a strong democracy helped 
maintain stability. Moreover, continuous conflict in the South served as a 
reminder of the importance of solving controversies peacefully. It is argued 
that this could have had the role of an external enemy as an element for a 
country's internal union (Walls 2009, 389).
Still in terms of political structure, there is much discussion about 
whether the country should move away its clan system and traditional deci-
sion-making mechanisms from its institutions, as it is argued that they gen-
erate rivalries in the public sphere. However, as imperfect as the peace and 
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institution-building process has been in Somaliland, its achievements are 
meaningful and demonstrate the importance of handling these processes in 
a local and bottom-up way. Thus, there are less disputes over the institutional 
progresses under construction.
In short, while other attempts of peacebuilding in Africa made by 
international organizations have failed, notably in Somalia, in Somaliland 
there is an example of the creation of stability driven solely by native leaders. 
In the region, a unique model of democracy was created, mixing Somali 
elements to Western prerogatives. In Africa, abrupt transitions to demo-
cratic regimes have caused instability in many countries. Somaliland is an 
example of how customs and traditional structures must be considered when 
establishing democratic regimes in countries as diverse and complex as the 
ones in Africa. This way, the country emerges as an interesting example of 
the construction of state structure not only for post-colonial nations around 
the world.
In terms of its search for recognition, it is undeniable that the country 
already fulfills the legal requirements in order to be considered a de facto state. 
The international community tends to follow the African Union's positions 
regarding boundaries in the continent, and it has been firm in defending that 
a possible recognition of Somaliland could lead to more instability. For the 
moment, the best strategies for the country are to maintain itself firm in its 
road to build a consolidated democracy. Achievements such as its response 
to the 2020 pandemic can accelerate this process, and it is interesting for 
the country to keep trying to influence decision makers in nations such as 
the US, the UK and Scandinavian countries, where there are many Somali 
expatriates. South Sudan, which obtained international recognition in 2011, is 
an example of successful international lobby. The government in Mogadishu, 
in its turn, continues to pose a difficult barrier for the country's recognition, 
by using its presence in international fora to advocate for Somalian union.
It is not possible to predict if Somaliland's dream is distant or close. 
It could happen in years, decades, or maybe never. Challenges, internal and 
external, are plentiful. However, the country has accomplished a lot with 
limited resources, and recognition would certainly help its development and, 
possibly, the establishment of peace in the Horn of Africa.
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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to understand the processes that culminated in the political suc-
cess of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland through a case study. Since its 
independence from Somalia in 1991, the country has gone through four electoral 
processes, considered fair and reliable, in addition to achieving significant stability 
in its territory, even without any international recognition and in adverse conditions. 
127Pio Penna Filho, Henrique Oliveira da Motta
Brazilian Journal of African Studies | Porto Alegre | v. 6, n. 11, Jan./Jun. 2021 | p. 109-127
It was concluded that the mixture of traditional elements with western democratic 
prerogatives was fundamental for the construction of stability in Somaliland. Gov-
ernments and governance structures that have long been present in Somali culture 
were used to resolve disputes when the state failed, and were later incorporated 
into formality in the form of Guurti, a council of elders that went on to function as 
a senate. Several negotiations and conferences, based on the customs of the region, 
took place during the 90s, uniting the different rival clans that inhabited Somaliland 
around an ideal of nation. Furthermore, the idea that in order to obtain recognition 
it would be necessary to establish a solid democracy also contributed to the country's 
political balance. In short, even though the nation has profound problems, such as 
misery, corruption and lack of recognition, it is possible to say that in Somaliland a 
new model of hybrid democracy has emerged so far successfully. And while attempts 
at peacebuilding in Africa by outside agents have failed, Somaliland is a successful 
example led by local actors using endogenous governance elements, which can bring 
lessons and teachings applicable to other cases on the continent.
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